] In regard to the first, notice that before an angel is made, we may say, in a certain manner of speaking, that the angel cannot be made, ] since no passive potentiality precedes its being, for an angel is not made from pre-existing matter.
If such a thing cannot be made, the impossibility will arise for one of two reasons: either because of an absence of a passive potentiality or because of some contradiction between the ideas involved. Tamen ex hoc non sequitur quod Deus non possit facere ut fiat aliquid semper ens. Sic ergo intelligendo, simpliciter concedendum est secundum fidem quod non potest creatum semper esse: quia hoc ponere esset ponere potentiam passivam semper fuisse: quod haereticum est. Primo modo posset dici, antequam Angelus sit factus, non potest Angelus fieri, quia non praeexistit ad eius esse aliqua potentia passiva, cum non sit factus ex materia praeiacente tamen Deus poterat facere Angelum, poterat etiam facere ut Angelus fieret, quia fecit, et factus est. Si autem dicatur quod hoc non potest fieri, hoc non potest intelligi nisi duobus modis, vel duas causas veritatis habere: vel propter remotionem potentiae passivae, vel propter repugnantiam intellectuum. ] It remains to be seen, therefore, whether something that has always existed can be made. ] As to the first, all parties agree that, in view of his infinite power, God could have made something that has always existed. If it be impossible that something caused by God has always existed, it will be so either because God could not make something that has always existed or because such a thing could not be made, regardless of God's ability to make it. Restat igitur videre, utrum sit possibile aliquid fieri quod semper fuerit. In prima autem parte omnes consentiunt: in hoc scilicet quod Deus potuit facere aliquid quod semper fuerit, considerando potentiam ipsius infinitam. Si autem dicatur hoc esse impossibile, vel hoc dicetur quia Deus non potuit facere aliquid quod semper fuerit, aut quia non potuit fieri, etsi Deus posset facere. However, someone may hold that there has always existed something that, nevertheless, had been wholly caused by God, and thus we ought to determine whether this position is tenable. If someone holds that something besides God could have always existed, in the sense that there could be something always existing and yet not made by God, then we differ with him: such an abominable error is contrary not only to the faith but also to the teachings of the philosophers, who confess and prove that everything that in any way exists cannot exist unless it be caused by him who supremely and most truly has existence. The question still arises whether the world could have always existed, and to explain the truth of this matter, we should first distinguish where we agree with our opponents from where we disagree with them. Let us assume, in accordance with the Catholic faith, Si autem intelligatur aliquid semper fuisse, et tamen causatum fuisse a Deo secundum totum id quod in eo est, Qui confitentur et probant omne quod est quocumque modo,Įsse non posse nisi sit causatum ab eo qui maxime et verissime esse habet. Si enim intelligatur quod aliquid praeter Deum potuit semper fuisse, quasi possit esse aliquid tamen ab eo non factum:Įrror abominabilis est non solum in fide, sed etiam apud philosophos,
Prius distinguendum est in quo cum adversariis convenimus, et quid est illud in quo ab eis differimus. Cuius dubitationis ut veritas explicetur, Supposito, secundum fidem Catholicam, quod mundus durationis initium habuit,ĭubitatio mota est, utrum potuerit semper fuisse. I am posting it for discussion purposes only, and will replace this at some point with a new translation and introduction. The current version uses Robert Miller's translation from the internet Medieval sourcebook. Here is a parallel text version of Aquinas De Eternitate Mundi.
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